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ABSTRACT
Boolean functions are essential in many stream ciphers. When
used in combiner generators, they need to have sufficiently
high values of correlation immunity, alongside other proper-
ties. In addition, correlation immune functions with small
Hamming weight reduce the cost of masking countermea-
sures against side-channel attacks. Various papers have ex-
amined the applicability of evolutionary algorithms for evolv-
ing cryptographic Boolean functions. However, even when
authors considered correlation immunity, it was not given
the highest priority. Here, we examine the effectiveness of
three different EAs, namely, Genetic Algorithms, Genetic
Programming (GP) and Cartesian GP for evolving correla-
tion immune Boolean functions. Besides the properties of
balancedness and correlation immunity, we consider several
other relevant cryptographic properties while maintaining
the optimal trade-offs among them. We show that evolv-
ing correlation immune Boolean functions is an even harder
objective than maximizing nonlinearity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) found their place in many
real-world applications where they offer a good balance be-
tween the ease of use and results. In particular, one area
where EAs have shown good results is the generation of
Boolean functions that are suitable for cryptography. How-
ever, since there are many possible design criteria for Boolean
functions in cryptography, this domain is still wide open
for research. In the rest of this paper, when we discuss
Boolean functions suitable for cryptography, we primarily
mean Boolean functions suitable to be used in combiner gen-
erators. In this paper, we are concentrating on the correla-
tion immunity property of Boolean functions. To date, this
property has not been the primary concern when evolving
Boolean functions and although there exist papers consid-
ering this property, they are mainly concerned with other
properties. Furthermore, correlation immunity is given a
limited span of desired values (i.e. correlation immunity of
first or second order) and only for balanced Boolean func-
tions.
When discussing methods of generating Boolean functions
with appropriate cryptographic properties, they can be di-
vided into three groups: algebraic constructions, random
generation and heuristics (and of course, different combina-
tions between those methods). Among various heuristic ap-
proaches, EAs offer highly competitive results when gener-
ating Boolean functions for cryptography. This is discussed
in Section 3. In this paper, we use EAs to experiment with
two very different usages of Boolean functions, but where in
both applications correlation immunity property has high
importance.
The first application explores the evolution of Boolean
functions appropriate for usage in combiner generators. The
second deals with the correlation immune Boolean functions
that have a small Hamming weight. Such functions have
application in side-channel countermeasures [2]. Although
we explore only those two applications, correlation immune
functions have more utilizations. For instance, they are also
directly related to those designs in mathematics called or-
thogonal arrays [4].
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1.1 Our Contribution
Our first contribution is an extensive analysis of the dif-
ficulty of obtaining balanced Boolean functions suitable for
cryptography that have various values of correlation immu-
nity property. The second contribution is, as far as the
authors know, the first application of EAs to find Boolean
functions with minimal Hamming weight and different corre-
lation immunity values. Both contributions have real-world
applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we give necessary information about Boolean functions, their
properties and trade-offs between some of those properties.
Next, Section 3 enumerates some of the relevant work. In
Section 4, we present experimental setup, Section 5 gives
results, short discussion and some guidelines for the future
work. Finally, Section 6 offers a summary of our work.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Notation.
The inner product of two vectors ~a and ~b is denoted as ~a ·~b
and equals ~a ·~b = ⊕ni=1aibi. Here, “ ⊕ ” represents bitwise
XOR. The set of all n-tuples of elements in the field F2 is
denoted as Fn2 where F2 is the Galois field with 2 elements.
An (n,m)-function (also called vectorial Boolean function) is
any mapping F from Fn2 to Fm2 . If m equals 1 then the func-
tion f is called a Boolean function. The Hamming weight
(HW) of a vector ~a, where ~a ∈ Fn2 , is the number of non-
zero positions in the vector. The support supp of a Boolean
function f is given by [5]:
supp(f) = x ∈ Fn2 |f(x) = 1. (1)
The Hamming weight of a Boolean function f on Fn2 is the
size (cardinality) of its support.
Representations.
A Boolean function f on Fn2 can be uniquely represented
by a truth table (TT), which is a vector (e.g. f(~0), ..., f(~1))
that contains the function values of f , ordered lexicograph-
ically, i.e. ~a ≤ ~b [5].
A second unique representation of a Boolean function f
is the Walsh transform Wf . It represents the correlation
between f(~x) and the linear function ~a · ~x [5]. The Walsh
transform of a Boolean function f equals:
Wf (~a) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
(−1)f(~x)⊕~a·~x. (2)
A third unique representation of a Boolean function f on
Fn2 is a polynomial in F2 [x0, ..., xn−1] /(x20 − x0, ..., x2n−1 −
xn−1). This form is called ANF and it is a multivariate
polynomial P defined as [5]:
P (~x) = ⊕~a∈Fn2 h(~a)~x
~a, (3)
where h(~a) is defined by the Mo¨bius inversion principle [5].
The Properties.
A Boolean function is balanced if its Hamming weight
(HW) is equal to 2n−1 [5]. Boolean functions need to be
balanced; otherwise (for sufficiently large n) it would be
possible to distinguish between the keystream output by the
function and some random sequence when using filter and
combiner generators [5].
The nonlinearity Nf of a Boolean function f can be ex-
pressed in terms of the Walsh coefficients as [5]:
Nf = 2
n−1 − 1
2
max~a∈Fn2 |Wf (~a)|. (4)
A Boolean function needs to have high nonlinearity value
in order to resist fast correlation attacks [5]. By high value
we mean a value that is near the covering radius bound
2n−1 − 2n2−1.
The algebraic degree deg of a Boolean function f is defined
as the number of variables in the largest product term of
the functions’ ANF having a non-zero coefficient. A Boolean
function needs to have high enough value of algebraic degree
to resist Berlekamp-Massey attack [5].
For a Boolean function f , we say it is correlation immune
of order t (in brief, CI(t)) if the output of the function
is statistically independent of the combination of any t of
its inputs [5]. A characterization exists using the Walsh
spectrum and it equals:
Wf (~a) = 0, for 0 ≤ HW (~a) ≤ t. (5)
A high value of correlation immunity property is necessary
for resisting Siegenthaler correlation attack when Boolean
functions are used in combiner generators [28].
A Boolean function f is t-resilient if it is balanced and
with correlation immunity of degree t [5].
The algebraic immunity AI of a Boolean function f is the
lowest degree of a nonzero function g from Fn2 into F2 for
which f · g = ~0 or (f ⊕~1) · g = ~0 where f and g are Boolean
functions [5]. Boolean functions need to have high values of
algebraic immunity in order to resist algebraic attacks [15].
Bounds and Trade-offs.
Sarkar and Maitra showed that if a CI(t) Boolean function
f has an even number of inputs n and k ≤ n
2
− 1 then its
nonlinearity Nf is upper bounded as follows [27]:
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2n2−1 − 2k, (6)
where k equals t+1 if f is balanced or has Hamming weight
divisible by 2t+1 and k equals t otherwise.
In the case when k > n
2
−1 then the nonlinearity is upper
bounded with:
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2k. (7)
The correlation immunity CI(t) and the algebraic degree
deg are conflicting properties and it is not possible to obtain
a function with both properties optimal. For a resilient func-
tion where t > 1 and t 6= n − 1, the following Siegenthaler
inequality holds [28]:
t ≤ n− deg − 1. (8)
Otherwise, the inequality is as follows:
t ≤ n− deg. (9)
The algebraic immunity is upper bounded by the number
of input variables, more precisely [14]:
AI ≤ dn
2
e. (10)
The next inequality shows a connection between the alge-
braic immunity and the algebraic degree properties:
AI ≤ deg. (11)
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2.1 Motivation and Objectives
Symmetric key cryptography can be divided into block
and stream ciphers [18]. In both categories, nonlinear el-
ements play an important role by adding confusion to the
algorithm. Informally speaking, without some nonlinear el-
ement, a cryptographic algorithm would be easy to break.
Boolean functions are considered the best known nonlinear
elements and they are used in stream ciphers, while vectorial
Boolean functions (commonly known as Substitution boxes
or S-boxes) are used in block ciphers.
Being more specific, many stream ciphers are realized as
the combination by a Boolean function of some bits ex-
tracted from one or several Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ters (LFSR), where LFSR is a linear construction used for
generating a sequence of binary bits. Two often explored
models that use an LFSR together with a nonlinear trans-
formation are the so-called combiner and the filter generator
models [5]. A combiner generator uses several LFSRs in par-
allel and then combines their output in a nonlinear way. In a
filter generator, the output is obtained by a nonlinear func-
tion of some taps of one longer LFSR [5]. Both models are
depicted in Figures 1a and 1b.
(a) Filter generator. (b) Combiner generator.
Figure 1: Principles of filter and combiner generators.
In general, for a Boolean function to be useful in such
framework it needs to be balanced, with high nonlinearity,
high algebraic immunity and a high algebraic degree. More-
over, to be used in a combiner generator it also needs to have
a high value of correlation immunity [5, 23, 28]. However, if
the correlation immunity is high, it is difficult to find high
algebraic immunity, which has resulted in a decreased use of
combiner generators.
For our first fitness objective, we are interested in Boolean
functions that are appropriate for usage in combiner gener-
ators. Furthermore, we concentrate only on Boolean func-
tions with eight inputs that have various values of correla-
tion immunity property. As evident from the Section 3, EAs
can be also used to evolve Boolean functions of larger size.
However, we decided to experiment with only one input size
in order to better answer the question of the difficulty of
evolving Boolean functions with different correlation immu-
nity values. Eight inputs is a relatively small size for Boolean
functions for stream ciphers (it is commonly considered that
13 is a strict minimum for resisting algebraic attacks), but
we still believe it presents an interesting case. Indeed, for
instance ciphers RAKAPOSHI [12] and Achterbahn [17] use
Boolean functions of that size.
In addition, we are interested in Boolean functions that
can help resist side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks
do not rely on the security of the underlying algorithm, but
rather on the implementation of the algorithm in a device.
Implementations running on small devices often provide an
adversary with unintentional output channels, often called
side channels. On some occasions, these types of information
leakages can be linked either to the types of operations that
the cipher is performing, or to the data. This makes the leak-
ages explorable by the adversary trying to extract the secret
key as they are always looking for shortcuts in cryptanaly-
sis [22]. One class of countermeasures against side-channel
attacks are masking schemes. In masking schemes one ran-
domizes the intermediate values that are processed by the
cryptographic device. One obvious drawback of such an ap-
proach is the masking overhead which can be substantial in
embedded devices or smart cards.
However, correlation immune Boolean functions can re-
duce the masking overhead in two ways [6,9]. The first way
is by applying leakage squeezing method [8,9] and the other
method uses Rotating S-box masking [6]. For the second
case the key is to generate Boolean functions with as high
as possible correlation immunity value and minimal Ham-
ming weight of their support. In the first case, there is a
constraint that f is the indicator of a permutation of F
n
2
2 .
In accordance to that, evolution of Boolean functions with
minimal Hamming weight is the goal of our second ob-
jective. We note here that most of algebraic constructions
are not a viable choice for this objective since they are de-
signed to generate balanced Boolean functions. Since this
is the first time EAs are to be used to evolve Boolean func-
tions with such properties, we again work with eight input
Boolean functions.
We conclude the case for our motivation with the citation
from [5], page 97: “But designing constructions leading to
large numbers of functions achieving good trade-offs between
the nonlinearity, the algebraic degree and the resiliency or-
der (if possible, on any numbers of variables) are still neces-
sary for permitting to choose in applications cryptographic
functions satisfying specific constraints.”
3. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we first briefly discuss applications of EAs
to the evolution of Boolean functions where correlation im-
munity is a property of interest.
Millan et al. use GAs to evolve Boolean functions that
have high nonlinearity [24]. In conjunction with the GA
they use hill-climbing and a resetting step in order to find
Boolean functions with even higher nonlinearity. They ex-
periment with Boolean function sizes of up to 12 inputs and
they find balanced eight input Boolean functions with non-
linearity 112 and correlation immunity equal to one.
Clark et al. use simulated annealing (SA) to generate
Boolean functions with cryptographically relevant proper-
ties [13]. In their work they consider balanced function with
high nonlinearity and with the correlation immunity less and
equal to two.
Burnett et al. present two heuristic methods where the
goal of the first method is generating balanced Boolean func-
tions with high nonlinearity and low autocorrelation. The
second method aims at generating resilient functions with
high nonlinearity and algebraic degree that maximizes Siegen-
thaler inequality [3].
McLaughlin and Clark on the other hand use SA to gener-
ate Boolean functions that have optimal values of algebraic
immunity, fast algebraic resistance and algebraic degree [23].
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In their work they experiment with Boolean functions of size
up to 16 inputs.
Picek et al. experiment with GA and GP to find Boolean
functions that possess several optimal properties among which
is correlation immunity [25]. As far as the authors know, this
is the first application of GP when evolving cryptographi-
cally suitable Boolean functions.
When discussing algebraic constructions and bounds there
exists a plethora of results on correlation immune Boolean
functions. We give here only a subset of relevant works.
Tarannikov suggests a method to construct n-variable and
t-resilient with maximal possible nonlinearity for 2n−7
3
≤
m ≤ n− log2 n−23 − 2 [29].
Carlet and Sarkar show the necessary condition on the
ANF of correlation immune Boolean functions that reach
maximal possible nonlinearity [10].
Maitra and Sarkar present constructions able to generate
n-variable and t-resilient Boolean functions that maximize
Siegenthaler inequality [21,26].
Le Bars and Viola present a complete characterization of
the first order correlation immune Boolean functions of up
to seven inputs [20].
Carrasco et al. use the approach from [20] to develop a
combinatorial method able to randomly generate first order
correlation immune functions [11]. With that method they
are able to generate eight input Boolean function with cor-
relation immunity equal to one in slightly more than five
seconds.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we briefly discuss the algorithms we use
and their parameters. We conduct a short two parameter
sweep in order to investigate the best combination of pa-
rameters for each of the algorithms. Since there are more
than two parameters for each algorithm, we try to consider
only the most obvious choices for the tuning.
4.1 Representations and Common Parameters
The GA represents the individuals as strings of bits where
values are truth tables of Boolean functions. GP uses a rep-
resentation where individuals are trees of Boolean primitives
which are then evaluated according to the truth table they
produce. CGP solutions are directed graphs with Boolean
primitives as nodes, that are also evaluated using the truth
table they produce.
The following parameters of the experiments are common
for every objective. The size of Boolean function is eight
(the size of the corresponding truth table is 256) and the
number of independent trials M for each experiment is 50
(the mean of best solutions from 50 runs is reported if not
stated otherwise). Stopping criterion for all algorithms is
500 000 evaluations. Common parameters are also given in
Table 1.
Table 1: Common parameters for EAs.
Parameter Parameter value
Boolean function input size n 8
Number of experiments 50
Stopping criterion 500 000 evaluations
4.2 Genetic Programming
The function set for GP in all experiments is OR, XOR,
AND, XNOR and AND with one input inverted. Terminals
correspond to n Boolean variables. Boolean functions may
be represented with only XOR and AND operators, but it
is quite easy to transform it from one notation to the other.
A small number of experiments were also conducted to se-
lect the appropriate operators, and based on that we used a
simple tree crossover with 90% bias for functional nodes and
a subtree mutation. We experiment with tree depth sizes of
5, 7, 8, 9 and 11 and population sizes of 100, 200, 500, 1 000
and 2 000.
4.3 Cartesian Genetic Programming
The function set nf for the CGP is the same as for the GP.
Setting the number of rows to be 1 and levels-back parameter
to be equal to the number of columns is regarded as the best
and most general choice [1]. We experiment with genotype
sizes of 300, 700, 1 100, 1 500 and 1 900 and for mutation
rates with values of 1%, 4%, 7%, 10% and 13%.
The number of input connections nn for each node is two
and the number of program output connections no is one.
The population size for CGP equals five in all our experi-
ments. For CGP individual selection we use a (1 + 4)-ES in
which offspring are favored over parents when they have a
fitness better than or equal to the fitness of the parent. The
mutation operator is one-point mutation where the muta-
tion point is chosen with a fixed probability. The number
of genes mutated is defined as fixed percentage of the total
number of genes. Note, the single output gene is not mu-
tated and is taken from the last node in the genotype. The
genes chosen for mutation might be a node representing an
input connection or a function.
4.4 Genetic Algorithm
We use a simple GA with elimination tournament selec-
tion with size 3 [16]. A mutation is selected uniformly at
random between a simple mutation, where a single bit is in-
verted, and a mixed mutation, which randomly shuffles the
bits in a randomly selected subset. The crossover operators
are one-point and uniform crossover, performed uniformly
at random for each new offspring. For each of the fitness
functions we experiment with population sizes of 50, 100,
200, 500 and 1 000 and mutation probabilities of 0.1, 0.3,
0.5, 0.7 and 0.9.
4.5 Fitness Functions
As discussed previously, we evolve Boolean functions for
two different settings. In the first setting, we want to evolve
balanced Boolean functions that have good correlation im-
munity values and that maximize the Siegenthaler inequal-
ity. First, we need to establish what are good values for
correlation immunity of Boolean functions with eight inputs.
When a Boolean function is used in a filter generator,
correlation immunity value of one is usually considered to
be sufficient. To obtain this value, often it is possible to
replace a Boolean function that has other good properties
with a linearly equivalent function that has the correlation
immunity equal to one [7].
However, when using Boolean functions in a combiner
generator, high values for correlation immunity are neces-
sary [28]. Therefore, in our experiments, we look for Boolean
functions that have the correlation immunity equal or larger
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than two which we believe is sufficient for a Boolean func-
tion with eight inputs. We stop with a correlation immunity
value of five in order to leave high enough value of the alge-
braic degree. Furthermore, such Boolean functions need to
have the maximal nonlinearity value according to the Sarkar-
Maitra divisibility bound. Therefore, for each of the target
correlation immunity values t, we know what are the max-
imal values that the other properties can reach. In accor-
dance to that, we can identify the global optimum for each
target correlation immunity value.
We aim to maximize the following fitness function:
fitness1 = BAL+ t+ δt,x(Nf +AI + deg), (12)
where δt,x is the Kronecker delta function that takes value
one when t = x and zero otherwise. Here, x is defined as
the target correlation immunity value in the range [2, 5].
The balancedness property (BAL) is calculated in the fol-
lowing way; if a function is balanced then we give it a value
of zero, otherwise we give it a negative value that amounts
to the absolute difference of the number of zeros and ones in
the truth table. A two stage fitness is used here in which a
fitness bonus equal to the sum of the nonlinearity, algebraic
immunity AI and algebraic degree deg is awarded only to a
solution that is t-resilient; otherwise, the fitness is only the
sum of the balancedness penalty and the correlation immu-
nity.
In the second setting, we look for unbalanced Boolean
functions that have correlation immunity values t in the
range [1, 5] and minimal Hamming weight of their truth ta-
ble representation (therefore, minimal cardinality of their
support). These conditions are presented in the following
equation where the goal is maximization:
fitness2 =
{
t+ δt,x(2
n −HW (TT )), if t = x
(2n −HW (TT )− 2n × abs(t− x), otherwise.
When the correlation immunity reaches some predefined
value, then the fitness equals the sum of the correlation im-
munity and the difference between the maximal HW of a
Boolean function’s truth table and a current one. For solu-
tions with incorrect correlation immunity values, we assign
them a value that allows those solutions to be differentiated
by their Hamming weight.
We do not apply multiobjective optimization since we
regard different properties as constraints of a fixed target
value, rather than independent objectives. This allows us
to focus on the best fitness values we can obtain while the
selected properties, such as balancedness, are held as con-
straints.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 The First Objective
When considering fitness function as given in Eq. (12), we
know what are the optimal values for each of the properties
we investigate. We give those values for each level of cor-
relation immunity in Table 2. As explained in the previous
section, it is obvious that the increase in the value of one
property results in the decrease of the values of other prop-
erties. We can see that the particularly interesting case is
when the correlation immunity equals two and three. For
those values the nonlinearity and the algebraic immunity
Table 2: Optimal values of properties, fitness1
t Nf AI deg Global optimum value
2 112 4 5 123
3 112 4 4 123
4 96 3 3 106
5 64 2 2 73
Table 3: Average fitness, fitness1, CGP.
Gen./mut. 1 4 7 10 13
t=2
300 101.68 99.48 97.04 101.3 100.84
700 105.08 114.38 106.26 110.36 112.7
1 100 110.32 116.56 114.68 116.16 115.84
1 500 109.84 118.6 117.08 110.54 114.34
1 900 111.72 116.12 117.42 116.92 115.28
t=3
300 78.8 79.76 87.06 88.16 82.52
700 93.86 95.04 95.66 99.52 97.52
1 100 90.94 103 103.56 101.9 100.6
1 500 93.42 105.4 104.06 101.86 99.86
1 900 95.3 103.38 100.5 101.12 101.76
t=4
300 56.28 58.18 59.64 49.94 60.06
700 60.28 81.18 71.76 77.82 79.8
1 100 75.68 79.88 84.62 90.68 75.78
1 500 75.24 88.64 88.62 82.58 88.46
1 900 73.04 82.56 85.3 87.26 89.92
t=5
300 20.02 32.88 21.92 25.84 26.0
700 34.16 32.78 35.56 34.34 39.28
1 100 36.98 39.58 41.04 38.62 43.64
1 500 35.56 49.02 42.46 50.5 42.4
1 900 30.44 50.42 54.12 40.9 38.62
properties have the same values. When reporting the ob-
tained property values for a certain solution, we use the
following notation: (Nf , t, deg,AI) and we only present bal-
anced solutions. In Table 3, we present mean fitness values
for CGP with the fitness function 1 for various target corre-
lation immunity values.
We give the number of times that each CGP variant reached
the global optimum in Table 4. When the target correlation
immunity equals three, there were no successful runs and
therefore we skip that case in the table. For all other corre-
lation immunity values, CGP proves to be an efficient algo-
rithm (when using fitness function as in Eq. (12)). The eas-
iest case seems to be when the correlation immunity equals
five, after that is the case when it is equal to four and then
two. Finally, the most difficult case is when the target cor-
relation immunity value equals three.
Next, we give average fitness values for GP and fitness
function 1 in Table 5. In Table 6, we display the number
of times that GP found the global optimum. As is the case
with CGP, when the correlation immunity equals three, the
algorithm could not find any global optimum solutions. Be-
sides that, it is interesting to notice that the cases when the
correlation immunity equals four and five are easier for GP
than CGP. This is particularly apparent when correlation
immunity equals five, since in that case GP has 100% suc-
cessfulness in reaching the global optimum. However, when
the correlation immunity equals two, then the performance
of CGP is substantially better than that of GP.
When experimenting with GA and fitness function 1 we
were unable to find any optimal solutions for any of the
correlation immunity values and therefore we do not present
similar tables with results for GA. We note that the maximal
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Table 4: # of optimal solutions, fitness1, CGP.
Gen./mut. 1 4 7 10 13
t=2
300 0 2 2 4 6
700 3 15 14 14 12
1 100 7 17 21 16 14
1 500 6 25 19 11 8
1 900 12 20 22 20 15
t=4
300 6 11 13 7 16
700 14 21 21 24 27
1 100 21 25 30 33 27
1 500 18 32 30 29 30
1 900 21 29 23 32 28
t=5
300 11 20 12 15 15
700 21 20 22 21 25
1 100 23 25 26 24 28
1 500 22 32 27 33 27
1 900 18 33 36 26 24
Table 5: Average fitness, fitness1, GP.
Pop./depth 5 7 8 9 11
t=2
100 110.2 113.8 113.24 110.98 110.18
200 109.94 112.46 113.7 111.16 110.6
500 110.42 113.86 113.1 112.9 110.4
1 000 112 112.3 111.54 113.24 110.48
2 000 115.08 115.8 113.68 113.72 111.12
t=3
100 105.9 106 16.04 106.04 106.02
200 105.9 106.02 106.02 106.06 106
500 105.98 106.04 106 106.02 106.04
1 000 106 106.08 106.02 106.02 106
2 000 106.04 106 106.02 106.06 106
t=4
100 85.24 102.8 99.6 99.6 99.6
200 89.8 96.36 98.92 99.58 94.44
500 92.56 102.16 100.24 100.24 99.56
1 000 97.04 101.52 97.66 102.16 97.66
2 000 98.96 102.8 100.88 98.32 96.96
t=5
100 73 73 73 73 73
200 73 73 73 73 73
500 73 73 73 73 73
1 000 73 73 73 73 73
2 000 73 73 73 73 73
value of correlation immunity we were able to find with GA
and bitstring encoding equals one.
When working with two-stage fitness function, there is al-
ways the possibility that the algorithm will not perform well
since it cannot reach the second stage. This is obviously true
for the GA case where most of the population at the end
of each run still have negative fitness values which means
that those solutions are unbalanced. In that case, solutions
can drastically improve their fitness only by becoming bal-
anced and with a correlation immunity value larger than
zero. However, the results implicate there is not enough
information (diversity) in the search pool to converge.
Therefore, we note that we could write the two-stage fit-
ness function differently. Since we know what is the best
possible nonlinearity value we can rewrite it as:
fitness1 = BAL+Nf + δNf ,x(t+AI + deg). (13)
Next, we experiment with the Eq. (13) for cases when
nonlinearity equals 112 (correlation immunity equal to two
and three). We disregard the cases when correlation im-
munity equals four and five since those seems to be much
easier problems. We do not present the results here, but
Table 6: # of optimal solutions, fitness1, GP.
Pop./depth 5 7 8 9 11
t=2
100 0 7 12 6 10
200 2 11 13 8 7
500 2 12 11 12 8
1 000 1 8 7 15 5
2 000 6 19 15 14 9
t=4
100 18 45 40 40 40
200 25 35 39 40 32
500 29 44 41 41 40
1 000 36 43 37 44 37
2 000 39 45 42 38 36
t=5
100 50 50 50 50 50
200 50 50 50 50 50
500 50 50 50 50 50
1 000 50 50 50 50 50
2 000 50 50 50 50 50
mention that again both CGP and GP reach the same value
corresponding to the global optimum relatively easily. Fur-
thermore, with this fitness function the GA also succeeds in
reaching the same value as GP and CGP.
However, we observe that all algorithms, although reach-
ing the global optimum value of the modified criteria, in
this case do not find the Boolean functions we are originally
looking for. Instead, in most of the cases solutions are ei-
ther (Nf , t, deg,AI) = (112, 0, 7, 4) or (112, 1, 6, 4). All
our experiments show that it is much easier to obtain a high
algebraic degree value than the high correlation immunity
value. In accordance to that, we need to further improve
our fitness function and not allow the algebraic degree to go
over a certain threshold value. Therefore, our new fitness
function equals:
fitness1 = BAL+Nf + δNf ,x(t+AI + δdeg,xdeg). (14)
In this function, we look only for Boolean functions with
nonlinearity 112 and algebraic degree less than a threshold
value (here, we set it to four and five). When not allowing
the algebraic degree to go over a value of five, we can reach
the maximal correlation immunity of two. In this case, GP
and CGP perform similarly as in fitness function given in
Eq. (12). This means that the best solutions are of the form
(112, 2, 5, 4).
However, when not allowing algebraic degree to be higher
than four, we are able to find solutions that have correla-
tion immunity equal to three. The caveat is that with this
fitness function the nonlinearity does not go over the value
96. Therefore, the best solutions are of the form (96, 3, 4,
4).
Again, GA with this fitness function does not succeed in
evolving solutions with correlation immunity equal to two
or three. Actually, our results show that for the GA there
is no statistical difference when using fitness function as in
Eqs. (13) or (14).
When comparing the efficiency of all three algorithms we
observe that GA is by far the worst. However, this might be
the problem of fitness function although we experimented
with several variations and never obtained a solution that
has a correlation immunity higher than one. However, when
trying to compare the efficiency of GP and CGP, the situa-
tion is much more fuzzy.
We have only two algorithms and four objectives (one fit-
ness function, but four possible correlation immunity values)
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Table 7: Results for fitness2, GP and CGP.
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
CGP, 500 197.73
(242)
175.8
(227)
132
(132)
88.33
(133)
CGP, 1500 206.27
(242)
169.93
(243)
134.13
(196)
131.67
(133)
GP, 500 178
(242)
171
(243)
138.4
(196)
133
(133)
GP, 5000 195.6
(242)
176.3
(243)
151.2
(196)
133
(133)
where one objective (correlation immunity equal to three)
behaves the same for both algorithms. In the case when we
use fitness function as in Eq. (12) then both algorithms can-
not find any correct solution. In the case of fitness function
as in Eq. (14), both algorithms always reach the same set of
values (96, 3, 4, 4). Notice that in this case the maximal ob-
tained nonlinearity value is the same as in the case when the
correlation immunity equals four. Therefore, with regards to
the nonlinearity property, these solutions are worse. Natu-
rally, such solutions have slightly higher algebraic immunity
which is a consequence of a trade-off between the algebraic
degree and the algebraic immunity properties.
5.2 The Second Objective
In this phase, we do not perform a thorough parameter
search; on the basis of the results from the previous phase,
we select tree depth to be seven when using GP and muta-
tion probability of 7% when using CGP.
To understand the difficulty of this problem, consider the
function that has all ones in its truth table. Therefore, the
cardinality of the support equals 256. In that case the cor-
relation immunity equals eight. However, by randomly flip-
ping a single bit, correlation immunity drops to zero (while
algebraic degree increases). Therefore, it is to be expected
that EAs will have problems to evolve such functions due to
the extreme sensitivity of some of the properties.
In Table 7, we give average fitness values for two CGP and
two GP variations when the correlation immunity ranges
from two to five. Furthermore, in parentheses we give the
maximal value that each algorithm reached. Recall that
we aim for fitness values that equal the sum of correlation
immunity and the number of zeros in truth table. Here, we
write zeros since we aim to maximize the fitness function and
we are looking for a minimal number of ones in the truth
table.
We do not present results for the correlation immunity
value equal to one since it appears to be a trivial case where
both algorithms find the global optimum easily. We note
that GA also succeeds in finding several minimal Hamming
weights when the correlation immunity equals to one. How-
ever, for all other cases GA is unsuccessful.
When evaluating the quality of the obtained solutions,
we refer to data from [2]. We see that when the correlation
immunity equals two, the minimal value of the cardinality of
support equals 12. However, the best solution we could find
is 16. Next, for the correlation immunity value of three, the
best cardinality equals 16 which is the same value as found
in our experiments. Furthermore, for correlation immunity
values of four and five the minimal cardinalities of support
are 64 and 128, respectively. We observe that both CGP
and GP reach those values.
Therefore, this scenario is in a sense similar to the first
one, i.e. for fitness function 1. For one of the correlation
immunity values EAs cannot find the optimal solutions, but
for the other cases both CGP and GP are able to find the
optimal values. This suggests that in general EAs are effi-
cient enough for a problem of this size. However, we note
that before giving the final verdict about the difficulty of
these problems, one must find the missing solutions as well
as conduct the analysis with more algorithms.
5.3 Future Work
As already mentioned, future work must encompass more
experiments in an effort to reach all known optimal solutions
for both fitness functions. There exists one simple improve-
ment of fitness function 2 we could have added, but decided
not to in order to assess the efficiency of our algorithms.
Since we look for a Boolean function with a minimal weight,
we could add a penalty to all solutions that have the correct
correlation immunity value, but are balanced.
Furthermore, one natural research avenue is to investi-
gate Boolean functions with more than eight inputs. It is
said that for the bigger sizes (e.g. n ≥ 9), EAs cannot
compete with some combinations of algorithms (e.g. the-
ory supplementing optimization methods) [19]. In [2], we
can see that for the correlation immunity equal to four, five
and six and Boolean functions of sizes 11, 12 and 13 there
are no known minimal values for the cardinality of support.
Finding those values would be an interesting goal not only
from the EA perspective, but also from the cryptographic
and mathematic perspectives, in design theory and even in
statistics.
Finally, here we are interested only in Boolean functions
that possess certain properties, while future research should
include experiments where the goal is a Boolean function (a
circuit) that is at the same time easy to implement [17].
6. CONCLUSION
This paper explores the performance of three evolutionary
algorithms on finding Boolean functions for cryptographic
applications with the focus on the correlation immunity prop-
erty. In the first application scenario, the goal is to find
balanced functions with varying correlation immunity, that
allows their usage in combiner generators. The second ob-
jective considers Boolean functions with minimal Hamming
weight, while attaining the desired correlation immunity.
Although we encountered varying success for different al-
gorithms, the results indicate that EAs are capable of ob-
taining optimal solutions for known function sizes, which
supports their application in conditions where the optimum
is not known in advance.
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